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Restrictions on Attorney Criticism of the Judiciary: A
Denial of First Amendment Rights
Before the Bar can function at all as a guardian of the public interests commited to its
care, there must be appraisal and comprehension of the new conditions, and changed
relationship of the lawyer to his clients, to his professional brethren and to the public.
That appraisal must pass beyond the pety details ofform and manners which have been
so largely the subject of our Code of Ethics, to more fundamental consideration of the
way in which our professional activities aect the welfare of socety as a whole. Our
canons of ethics for the most part are generalizations des'gned for an earlier era.
I. Introduction
The American Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility (the
Code) states that attorneys should assist in improving the legal system.2 Be-
cause of their education and experience, attorneys are especially qualified to
recognize and help remedy deficiencies in that system.3 Attorney criticism of
the judiciary plays an important role in improving the legal system by expos-
ing abusive behavior by judges. Because attorneys operate within the legal
system, understand the judicial process, and are familiar with individual
judges, attorneys are particularly suited to serve as a check on the judiciary.
In fact, some commentators have considered attorney criticism of the judici-
ary a professional duty.
4
Although the Code recognizes the duty of attorneys to criticize the judi-
ciary, it does not adequately define the boundaries of acceptable attorney
criticism. Because the Code's language is ambiguous and its rules inconsis-
tent, the degree of first amendment protection afforded an attorney's criti-
cism of the judiciary is unclear. Feeling a moral obligation to criticize
publicly the conduct of a member of the judiciary, expose problems, or sug-
gest improvements in the legal system, an attorney may believe his criticism is
justified under the Code.5 He may also contend that his criticism is protected
under the first amendment. Traditionally, however, courts have construed
the Code as restricting all attorney criticism of the judiciary.6 The courts
have based their decisions on one of two assumptions: (1) criticism of the
judiciary tends to diminish public confidence in the legal system; or (2) attor-
1 ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrry, Preface (1975) (as amended 1977) [hereinafter
cited as ABA CODE].
2 Id, Canon 8.
3 Id., EC 8-1.
4 See, e.g., H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 59-62 (1953); Warren, In Conclusion: The Duty of Responsible
Criticism, in LEGAL INST=TUTIONs TODAY AND TOMORROW 320, 323-24 (M. Paulsen ed. 1959); Comment,
Silence Ordrs-PrAeseving Political Expression by Defendants and Their Lawyers: King v. Jones, 6 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REv. 595 (1971).
5 See notes 46-48 infia and accompanying text.
6 See notes 54-55 infra and accompanying text.
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neys relinquish certain rights in exchange for their special status as members
of a regulated profession. 7 Most courts have rejected first amendment argu-
ments, claiming that free speech considerations do not outweigh the state's
interest in defending its public officials.8
The courts have imposed severe sanctions, including public reprimand,
suspension, and even disbarment, for violations of the Code's restrictions on
attorney criticism of the judiciary.9 The fear of such sanctions often prevents
attorneys from commenting on judicial performance which, in turn, endan-
gers the legal profession's role as "guardian of the public interest."' 0 Further-
more courts imposing such sanctions fail in their role as guardians of
constitutional privileges.
This note considers the first amendment rights involved in attorney criti-
cism of the judiciary in light of the Code's standards and the judicial inter-
pretations of those sanctions. I I A division of opinion in the lower courts and
the propensity of the Supreme Court of the United States to recognize other
constitutional rights of attorneys indicate a need to develop a uniform stan-
dard for evaluating attorney criticism which would no longer restrict first
amendment rights.
7 See notes 56-73 infra and accompanying text.
8 See notes 93-96 infra nd accompanying text. Restrictions on attorney criticism of the judiciary
have been upheld in a variety of situations. See, e.g., In re Terry, 71 Ind. Dec. 333, 394 N.E.2d 94 (1979),
cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1025 (1980), In re Frerichs, 238 N.W.2d 764 (Iowa 1976), and In re Raggio, 87 Nev.
369, 487 P.2d 499 (1971) (prohibiting attorney criticism of the opinion of a court); State v. Russell, 227
Kan. 897, 610 P.2d 1122 (1980); In re Thatcher, 80 Ohio St. 492, 89 N.E. 39 (1909) and In re Gorsuch, 76
S.D. 191, 75 N.W.2d 644 (1956) (prohibiting attorney criticism of the conduct of a judge in his campaign
for judicial office); In re Whiteside, 386 F.2d 805 (2d Cir. 1967) and Eisenberg v. Boardman, 302 F. Supp.
1360 (D. Wis. 1969) (prohibiting attorney criticism of the private activities of a judge). Attorneys have
been disciplined for statements made in public. See, e.g., In re Friedland, 268 Ind. 536, 376 N.E.2d 1126
(1978); Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Heleringer, 602 S.W.2d 165 (Ky. 1980); In re Raggio, 87 Nev. 369, 487 P.2d
499 (1971); In re Lacey, 283 N.W.2d 250 (S.D. 1979); In re Gorsuch, 76 S.D. 191, 75 N.W.2d 644 (1956);
State Bd. of Law Examiners v. Spriggs, 61 Wyo. 70, 155 P.2d 285 (1945). They have also been disciplined
for statements made in legal documents filed in court. See, e.g., In re Whiteside, 386 F.2d 805 (2d Cir.
1967); Spencer v. Dixon, 290 F. Supp. 531 (W.D. La. 1968); In re Philbrook, 105 Cal. 471, 38 P. 884 (1895);
In re Shimek, 284 So. 2d 686 (Fla. 1973); Kentucky State Bar Ass'n v. Lewis, 282 S.W.2d 321 (Ky. 1955);
Attorney General v. Nelson, 263 Mich. 686, 249 N.W. 439 (1933). Restrictions on attorney criticism have
even been upheld when the statement was made in good faith. See, e.g., State ex rel. Florida Bar v.
Calhoon, 102 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 1958); State ex retl. Florida Bar v. Edwards, 102 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 1958);
Kentucky State Bar Ass'n v. Lewis, 282 S.W.2d 321 (Ky. 1955).
9 See Note, Attorney Discipline and the First Amendment, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 922 n. 1 (1974). For a sum-
mary of the disciplinary procedures adopted by most states, see Note, Self-Incriminatio" Privilege, Immunity,
and Comment in Bar Disciplinaq, Proceedings, 72 MIcH. L. REV. 84, 85 n.5 (1973).
Federal courts also have authority to discipline attorneys. See, e.g., In re Whiteside, 386 F.2d 805 (2d
Cir. 1967); In re Belli, 371 F. Supp. 111 (D.D.C. 1974); Spencer v. Dixon, 290 F. Supp. 531 (W.D. La.
1968); Eisenberg v. Boardman, 302 F. Supp. 1360 (D. Wis. 1969). Although federal courts make their own
findings of fact, they may use state bar proceedings as guidelines. See In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 547
(1968). Federal courts even have authority to disbar an attorney for offenses against a state court. See In re
Grimes, 364 F.2d 654 (10th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1035 (1967).
10 ABA CODE, Preface.
11 This note will deal with cases in which an attorney criticized either (1) the opinion of a court or (2)
the professional or private conduct of a judge. Although it will include cases in which the criticism was
directed at the judicial performance with respect to a pending case, it will not deal with cases in which the
right to a fair trial was also an issue. For a thorough discussion of the fair trial issue, see Note,Judicial
Restraints on Attorneys' Speech Concerning Pending Litigation.: Reconciling the Rights to Fair Trial and Freedom of
Speech, 33 VAND. L. REV. 499 (1980).
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II. Historical Development of Restrictions on Attorney
Criticism of the Judiciary
Even before the enactment of the Code, courts concerned with maintain-
ing respect for attorneys and judges, discouraged criticism of either group. 12
More than a century ago, in Bradly v. Fisher,'3 the Supreme Court declared
that an attorney was obligated to comply with certain standards which in-
cluded "maintain[ing] at all times respect due to courts . . . and judicial of-
ficers both in and out of court." 14 According to the Court, even an attorney's
threat to personally chastise a judicial officer would be grounds for disbarring
the attorney. 1
5
It was not necessary that the attorney's comments actually lessen public
confidence in the legal system as long as they had the potential to do so. The
Bradley decision was inadequate because it failed to (1) define the boundaries
of the ethical standards it sought to maintain, (2) consider the effects of a
strict application of these disciplinary regulations on attorneys' first amend-
ment rights, and (3) recognize that a certain amount of criticism of the judici-
ary would help to maintain the viability of the legal system.16
Thirty-six years after Bradley, the American Bar Association (ABA)
adopted the Canons of Professional Ethics (the Canons), which provided na-
tional guidelines for professional conduct. 17 On the one hand, the Canons
encouraged attorney criticism of the judiciary. They recognized "the right
and duty of the lawyer" to submit his grievances against judicial officers to
the proper authorities when sufficient grounds for complaint exist.', The Ca-
nons stated that "[l]awyers should expose without fear or favor before the
proper tribunals corrupt or dishonest conduct in the profession . ". .. ,9 On
the other hand, the Canons, like the Court in Bradley, sought to maintain
public confidence in the legal profession by restraining attorney criticism of
the judiciary. The Canons required attorneys to observe a respectful attitude
toward the courts, "not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judi-
cial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance. o20 Under the
Canons, attorneys were to maintain the profession's "honor and propriety."'2'
Although the Canons purported to lift the ban on attorney criticism of the
judiciary, their language remained broad enough to restrict any attorney crit-
icism potentially harmful to the professional image. As a result, most judicial
decisions under the Canons prohibited attorney criticism without regard to
the actual effect of the statement on the public's confidence in the legal pro-
12 See note 22 infra.
13 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1872). During the recess of a criminal trial, one of the defense attorneys
accosted the presiding judge "in a rude and insulting manner, charging the judge with offering him [the
attorney] a series of insults from the bench from the commencement of the trial." Id at 337. Although the
judge disclaimed any intention ofpassing insult, the attorney "threatened the judge with personal chastise-
ment." Id
14 Id at 355.
15 Id at 356.
16 Note, Auoernf Diwipllne and the First Amendment, supra note 9, at 924.
17 See DRINKER, supra note 4, at 22-26.
18 ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, No. 1 (1908).
19 Id, No. 29.
20 Id, No. 1.
21 Id, No. 24.
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fession.2 2
The Supreme Court challenged this traditional attitude of restraint in
1959. In re Sawyer 23 reversed the decision of the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit to suspend an attorney from the practice of law.
Harriet Sawyer was a defense attorney in a Honolulu trial of several
people charged with conspiracy under the Smith Act.24 Her clients included
members and officers of labor unions, among them members of the Interna-
tional Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union (ILWU).25 Six weeks af-
ter the trial had begun, Sawyer made a speech at a meeting sponsored by the
ILWU in Honokaa, Hawaii, 182 miles from Honolulu. 26 In her speech, she
publicly criticized some "rather shocking and horrible things that went on at
trial. '2 7 She said that the Honolulu trial was really a way to get at the
ILWU. She spoke, in general, of the nature of conspiracy prosecutions under
the Smith Act and charged that when the Government does not have enough
evidence "it lumps a number [of defendants] together and says they agreed to
do something. '28 Using the Honolulu trial as an example, she said that some
of the Government's witnesses had given prior inconsistent testimony so that
the Government could convict. According to Sawyer, "[t]here's no fair trial
in a Smith Act case. All rules of evidence have to be scrapped or the Govern-
ment can't make a case."
' 2 9
Upon recommendation of the Bar Association of Hawaii, the Supreme
Court of Hawaii held that Sawyer had engaged in "a willful oral attack upon
the administration of justice in [the] United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Hawaii and by direct statement and implication impugned the integ-
rity of the [presiding] judge . . . -30 The territorial supreme court
suspended Sawyer from the practice of law for a year. The Ninth Circuit
affirmed 3' and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.32 A four-member plu-
rality of the Court reversed the decision recognizing that attorney criticism
ought to be given maximum protection. Writing for himself and three broth-
ers, Justice Brennan stated that the record was insufficient to support the
22 Florida Bar v. Stokes, 186 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 1966); State ex rel. Florida Bar v. Calhoon, 102 So. 2d
604 (Fla. 1958); State ex rel. Florida Bar v. Edwards, 102 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 1958); In re Glenn, 256 Iowa
1233, 130 N.W.2d 672 (1964); Kentucky State Bar Ass'n v. Lewis, 282 S.W.2d 321 (Ky. 1955); In re Lord,
255 Minn. 370, 97 N.W.2d 287 (1959); State ex re. Nebraska State Bar Ass'n v. Nielsen, 179 Neb. 55, 136
N.W.2d 355 (1965), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 383 U.S. 154 (1968); State ex re. Nebraska State Bar
Ass'n v. Rhodes, 177 Neb. 650, 131 N.W.2d 118 (1964); State v. Kavanaugh, 52 N.J. 7, 243 A.2d 225, cer.
denied, 393 U.S. 924 (1968); State v. Van Duyne, 43 N.J. 369, 204 A.2d 841, cert. denied, 380 U.S. 987
(1964); In re Greenfield, 24 App. Div. 2d 651, 262 N.Y.S.2d 349, (2d Dep't 1965); Cincinnati Bar Ass'n v.
Bednarczuk, 22 Ohio St. 2d 99, 258 N.E.2d 116 (1970); In re Gorsuch, 76 S.D. 191, 75 N.W.2d 644 (1965);
In re Simmons, 65 Wash. 2d 88, 395 P.2d 1013 (1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965).
23 360 U.S. 622 (1959). Three separate opinions were filed in Sawyer. Justice Brennan delivered the
plurality opinion in which Chief Justice Warren, Justice Black, and Justice Douglas joined. Justice Frank-
furter wrote the dissenting opinion in which Justice Clark, Justice Harlan, and Justice Whittaker joined.
Justice Stewart filed a separate concurring opinion.
24 Id at 623.
25 Id. at 627.
26 Id at 623.
27 Id at 628.
28 Id at 628-29.
29 Id at 629.
30 Id at 626.
31 In re Sawyer, 260 F.2d 189 (9th Cir. 1958).
32 358 U.S. 892 (1958).
[February 1981]
[Vol. 56:489]
finding that the attorney's statement, made out-of-court but during a pend-
ing trial, impugned the integrity of the trial judge or reflected adversely upon
his impartiality and fairness at trial.33 According to Justice Brennan, Saw-
yer's speech was a criticism of the laws governing the Smith Act trial and not
an attack on the judges who enforce those laws.3 4 Justice Brennan noted
that, although Sawyer referred to the Honolulu trial as a "typical, present
example of the evils thought to be attendant on such trials," 35 she avoided
phrasing her complaints "in terms of what 'the judge' was doing.'"36
Justice Brennan rejected the argument that, during pending trials, even
attorney criticism of the state of the law or judges in general is prohibited:
A lawyer does not acquire a license to do things by not being presently engaged in a
case .... We can conceive no ground whereby the pendency of litigation might be
thought to make an attorney's out-of-court remarks more censurable, other than they
might tend to obstruct the administration of justice.
3 7
Justice Brennan declared that attorney criticism of the judiciary should be
proscribed only in those rare instances when the statement directly "tend[s] to
obstruct the administration of justice. ' 38 He focused on the actual, rather
than the potential, effect of the statement.
Justice Frankfurter, in dissent with three other justices, subscribed to the
traditional notion that an attorney is not merely another citizen but an officer
of the court who must adhere to certain standards of conduct. Although Jus-
tice Frankfurter recognized that an attorney has both a professional responsi-
bility and a constitutional right to criticize the courts, he argued that an
attorney should be prohibited from going "before a public gathering and
fiercely charg[ing] that a trial in which he is a participant is unfair [and] that
the judge lacks integrity. ' 39 Justice Frankfurter characterized Sawyer's state-
ment as a willful attack on the administration of justice in a particular case
which "patently impugned, even if by clear implication rather than blatant
words, the integrity of the presiding judge."'4 Justice Frankfurter argued
that such criticism should not be constitutionally protected regardless of the
likelihood that the statement would reach the judge or the jury.4' Whereas
the plurality opinion held that only criticism which actually "tends" to ob-
struct justice should be prohibited, Justice Frankfurter, stressing the attor-
ney's intent, argued that even criticism which merely "attempts" to
prejudice a case or impugn the integrity of a judge should be prohibited.42
33 Id at 626-27.
34 Id at 631-33.
35 Id at 633.
36 Id at 634. The facts of the case state that "the judge" was not mentioned by name in the speech.
37 Id at 636.
38 Id For a discussion of the impact of the plurality opinion in Sawyer, see Comment, supra note 4, at
599-600.
39 Id at 669 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
40 Id at 652.
41 Id at 668.
42 See id at 652. Unlike the other eight justices, Justice Stewart, in his separate opinion, asserted the
traditional position that an attorney must conform to "inherited standards of propriety and honor." Id at
646 (Stewart, J., concurring). He concurred, however, with the majority opinion based on the facts of the
case. Id at 646.
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The Frankfurter standard, like the Bradley standard, focused on the poten-
tially harmful effect of the statement.
Despite the decision in Sawyer, many lower courts have continued to up-
hold severe restrictions on attorney criticism of the judiciary.43 Instead of
applying the "tend to obstruct" test of the plurality opinion in Sawyer, most
courts have continued to apply the traditional standards established in Brad-
ley and reiterated in the Canons and the Frankfurter dissent in Sawyer. Be-
cause the standards governing attorney criticism of the judiciary remained
unclear after Sawyer, the ABA made another attempt to clarify the scope of
the restraints on attorney criticism in the 1969 Code of Professional Responsi-
bility.
III. Attorney Criticism of the Judiciary Under the Code
of Professional Responsibility
Like its predecessor, the Canons, the Code of Professional Responsibility
attempts to define attorneys' responsibilities in the administration of justice.
To maintain the public's trust in the legal system, the Code holds lawyers to a
higher standard of conduct than laymen. 44 The rationale of the Code is that,
because the public's respect for the legal system is based upon its respect for
individual members of the profession, the slightest misconduct on the part of
an attorney tends to lessen public confidence in the system.
45
A. The Inconsistencies in the Code
The conflict presented in Sawyer was not resolved in the Code. Some
Code provisions, like the Brennan standard, encourage attorney critism of the
judiciary; others, like the Frankfurter standard, stifle such criticism. For ex-
ample, Canon 8 of the Code implicitly protects an attorney's right to com-
43 See, e.g., In re Whiteside, 386 F.2d 805 (2d Cir. 1967); In re Belli, 371 F. Supp. 111 (D.D.C. 1974);
Spencer v. Dixon, 290 F. Supp. 531 (W.D. La. 1968); Eisenberg v. Boardman, 302 F. Supp. 1360 (D. Wis.
1969); Florida Bar v. Stokes, 186 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 1966); In re Terry, 71 Ind. Dec. 333, 394 N.E.2d 94
(1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1025 (1980); In re Friedland, 268 Ind. 536, 376 N.E.2d 1126 (1978); In re
Frerichs 238 N.W.2d 764 (Iowa 1976); In re Glenn, 256 Iowa 1233, 130 N.W.2d 672 (1964); State v. Rus-
sell, 227 Kan. 897, 610 P.2d 1122 (1980); Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Heleringer, 602 S.W.2d 165 (Ky. 1980);
State ex rel. Nebraska Bar Ass'n v. Rhodes, 177 Neb. 650, 131 N.W.2d 118 (1964); In re Raggio, 87 Nev.
369, 487 P.2d 499 (1971); In re Meeker, 76 N.M. 354, 414 P.2d 862 (1966); State v. Kavanaugh, 52 N.J. 7,
243 A.2d 225, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 924 (1968), State v. Van Duyne, 43 N.J. 369, 204 A.2d 841, cert. denied,
380 U.S. 987 (1964); In re Greenfield, 24 App. Div. 2d 651, 262 N.Y.S.2d 349 (2d Dep't 1965); Cincinnati
Bar Ass'n v. Bednarczuk, 22 Ohio St. 2d 99, 258 N.E.2d 116 (1970); In re Simmons, 65 Wash. 2d 88, 395
P.2d 1013 (1964).
44 ABA CODE, Preamble. The Code consists of three separate but interrelated parts: the Canons
which are general statements of standards of professional conduct, the ethical considerations which are
aspirational objectives, and the disciplinary rules which prescribe the minimum level of professional con-
duct below which no lawyer can fall without being subjected to disciplinary action. Id., Preliminary State-
ment. The Code was divided into these three parts to forestall any attack upon discipline under the Code
as arbitrary and therefore unconstitutional. Wright, The Code of Professional Responsibiiy. Ir Histon, and
Objectives, 24 ARK. L. REv. 1, 11 (1970). (Edward L. Wright chaired the ABA Special Committee on
Evaluation of Ethical Standards.)
45 Id., EC 1-5. The Code does not directly regulate the profession in the individual states. By its
terms, the Code is designed to be adopted by the appropriate state agencies as a means of regulating the
practice of law. Id., Preliminary Statement. As of 1974, 47 states have incorporated the Code-either
intact or with minor revisions-into state statutes which are construed by state disciplinary committees
and courts. State Bar v. Semaan, 508 S.W.2d 429, 432 (Tex. Ct. App. 1974). For a list of state statutes
enacting the Code, see PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE LAWYER 221 (N. Galston ed. 1977).
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ment.4 6 The ethical considerations (ECs) under Canon 8 encourage attorney
criticism of the judiciary. They state that attorneys are "especially qualified
to recognize deficiencies in the legal system" 4 7 and therefore have a "special
responsibility," 48 not merely a right, to offer commentary about the judiciary
to aid in the selection of qualified persons. These ECs encourage the attorney
not only to exercise his first amendment rights but also to promote the availa-
bility of public information about the quality of the judiciary and the con-
duct of individual judges. The disciplinary rules (DRs) under Canon 8,
however, limit the scope of the ECs. DR 8-102 states that an attorney may
"not knowingly make false statements of fact concerning the qualifications of
a candidate for election or appointment to a judicial office" 49 or "knowingly
make false accusations against a judge or other adjudicatory officer."50
Other sections of the Code, however, discourage attorney comment, ig-
noring the attorney's "special responsibility" to educate the public. EC 1-5
states that an attorney "should be temperate and dignified"5 1 so that public
confidence in the legal system is in no way diminished. EC 8-6 requires that
an attorney "be certain of the merits of his complaint, use appropriate lan-
guage, and avoid petty criticisms, for unrestrained and intemperate state-
ments tend to lessen public confidence in our legal system."'5 2 DR 1-102
forbids attorneys from engaging in "conduct that is prejudicial to the admin-
istration of justice. '53 Although the Code establishes standards for profes-
sional conduct, it fails to define what forms of conduct are "prejudicial to the
administration ofjustice." Because the Code's standards are inconsistent and
vague, attorneys are uncertain about the extent of their first amendment pro-
tection. An attorney who feels certain that his complain has "merit," his lan-
guage is "appropriate," and his criticism is not "petty" may nevertheless
refrain from making a statement about a judge. The mere threat of sanctions
not only stifles the attorney's first amendment rights but also deprives the
public of information about the conduct and the quality of its judicial of-
ficers.
B. Judicial Decisions Under the Code
The judicial decisions applying the Code's standards for attorney criti-
cism of the judiciary have been no more consistent than the standards them-
selves. Some decisions applying the Code's standard of "prejudice to the
administration of justice" follow the Frankfurter view, restricting all poten-
tially harmful comments, 54 whereas other decisions reflect the Brennan view,
46 ABA CODE, Canon 8, provides: "A lawyer should assist in improving the legal system."
47 Id, EC 8-1.
48 Id, EC 8-6.
49 Id, DR 8-102(A).
50 Id, DR 8-102(B).
51 Id, EC 1-5.
52 Id, EC 8-6.
53 Id, DR 1-102(A)(5).
54 See, e.g., In re Shimek, 284 So. 2d 686 (Fla. 1973); In re Friedland, 268 Ind. 536, 376 N.E.2d 1126
(1978); In re Terry, 71 Ind. Dec. 333, 394 N.E.2d 94 (1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1025 (1980); In re
Frerichs, 238 N.E.2d 764 (Iowa 1976); State v. Russell, 227 Kan. 897, 610 P.2d 1122 (1980); In re Raggio,
87 Nev. 369, 487 P.2d 449 (1971); In re Lacey, 283 N.W.2d 250 (S.D. 1979).
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restricting only those comments that actually cause harm.55
The courts restricting potentially harmful comments, like the Frank-
furter opinion, uphold the traditional ban on attorney criticism of the judi-
cary. They justify their decisions on one of two bases: (1) the attorney-
layman distinction or (2) the need to maintain public confidence in the legal
system. These courts have been able to reject any attacks on the constitution-
ality of restraints on attorney comments by broadly interpreting the Code's
language.
The attorney-layman distinction is the first basis frequently cited by
courts to justify restrictions on potentially harmful attorney criticism of the
judiciary. These courts maintain that, whereas a layman is entitled to all the
protection available under the Constitution, an attorney relinquishes certain
rights in return for the status he gains when he enters the profession. 56 His
right of free speech, at least as far as it is exercised in his professional capacity,
is one of the rights he loses.
5 7
On the basis of the attorney-layman distinction, the Supreme Court of
Nevada upheld the traditional ban on attorney criticism of the judiciary. In
re Raggio58 held that public statements of a district attorney criticizing the
opinion of the state supreme court warranted reprimand. 59 The court said
that it was "never surprised when persons, not intimately involved with the
administration of justice, speak out in anger or frustration about the [court's]
work and the manner in which the [court] perform[s] it, and [would] protect
their right to so express themselves. ' 60 The court distinguished laypersons
from members of the bar who have sworn to uphold professional standards of
conduct. It declared that "[c]onformity with those standards has proven es-
sential to the administration of justice."16' Without mentioning the words
spoken by the attorney, the court focused on the potential effect of the criti-
cism, saying that the right of free speech does not give an attorney the right to
"denigrate" a court in the eyes of the public.
6 2
55 See, e.g., In re Oliver, 452 F.2d 111 (7th Cir. 1971); Polk v. State Bar of Texas, 374 F. Supp. 784
(N.D. Tex. 1974); Justices of App. Div. v. Erdmann, 33 N.Y.2d 559, 301 N.E.2d 426, 347 N.Y.S.2d 441
(1973).
56 The rationale for holding an attorney to a higher standard of conduct was provided by Judge
Cardozo in Peopleexrel. Karlin v. Culkin, 248 N.Y. 465,470-71, 162 N.E. 487, 489 (1928): "'Membership
in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions.' [Citation omitted.] The appellant was received into
that ancient fellowship for something more than private gain. He became an officer of the court, and, like
the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends ofjustice." In Thread v. United States, 354
U.S. 278, 281 (1957), the Supreme Court endorsed the views of Judge Cardozo.
57 The Supreme Court of Missouri explained: "A layman may, perhaps, pursue his theories of free
speech. . .until he runs afoul of the penalties of libel or slander, or into some infraction of our statutory
law. A member of the bar can, and will, be stopped at the point where he infringes our Canons of Ethics."
In re Woodward, 300 S.W.2d 385, 393-94 (Mo. 1957) (en banc). Rinaldi v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston,
Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 369, 366 N.E.2d 1299, 397 N.Y.S.2d 943 (1977) indicates the greater tolerance courts have
for criticism by laymen. The defendants in that case described Judge Rinaldi as one of the "10 worse
Judges in New York," "incompetent," and "probably corrupt." Id at 373, 376, 366 N.E.2d at 1301, 1303,
397 N.Y.S.2d at 945, 947. The court held that a "[p]laintiff may not recover from defendants for simply
expressing their opinion of his judicial performance, no matter how unreasonable, extreme or erroneous
these opinions might be." Id at 380-81, 366 N.E.2d at 1306, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 950.
58 87 Nev. 369, 487 P.2d 499 (1971).
59 Id at 370-71, 487 P.2d at 500.
60 Id at 372, 487 P.2d at 500-01.
61 Id. at 372, 487 P.2d at 501.
62 Id at 371, 487 P.2d at 500.
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The Supreme Court of Iowa has also used the attorney-layman distinc-
tion to reject an attorney's first amendment claim. In re Frerichs63 held that a
statement by an attorney that the state supreme court had refused to address
a constitutional issue warranted professional discipline even though the state-
ment was not intended to show disrespect for the court. 64 Although acknowl-
edging the attorney's right and duty to criticize in a manner allowed by the
Canons, the court concluded that an attorney, acting in his professional ca-
pacity, may have fewer rights of free speech than would a private citizen.65
Recently in State v. Russell,66 the Supreme Court of Kansas, restricted the
first amendment rights of an attorney when he was acting as a private citi-
zen.67 In Russell, the court publicly censured the attorney for placing in a
Kansas newspaper an advertisement uncomplimentary to his opponent in a
local political campaign. The court declared that an attorney is bound by
the Code in every capacity, whether acting as a lawyer or as a citizen. 68
The need to maintain public confidence in the legal system is the second
basis cited by courts to justify restrictions on potentially harmful criticism.
The Supreme Court of Florida, in In re Shimek, proscribed language "calcu-
lated to cast a cloud of suspicion upon the entire judiciary of the State of
Florida. ' '69 Shimek involved an attorney disciplined for having stated in a
memorandum filed with the court that a trial judge had avoided the perform-
ance of his sworn duty. 70 Similarly, the Supreme Court of South Dakota
publicly censured an attorney for publishing in a newspaper complaints
"casting doubt on the competence and integrity of the judiciary. '71 In re
Lacey found that the attorney's statement that "[t]he courts were incompetent
and sometimes downright crooked" was not constitutionally protected even
though the attorney contended that he had made the statement in good faith
and in the spirit of constructive criticism. 72 The court rejected a first amend-
ment argument on the grounds that the attorney had breached obligations
imposed upon him by law. 73
Since the promulgation of the Code, a few lower courts, following the
Brennan opinion, have rejected the traditional ban on attorney criticism of
the judiciary. Although they do not specifically refer to the Sawyer decision,
most of these courts base their holdings, as did Justice Brennan, on the ab-
sence of any actual harmful effect of the criticism. Injustices of the Appellate
Division, First Department v. Erdmann,74 the Court of Appeals of New York re-
versed a lower court decision to discipline an attorney for statements made in
a magazine article. In the article, the attorney criticized trial judges for fail-
63 238 N.W.2d 764 (Iowa 1976).
64 Id at 770.
65 Id at 769.
66 227 Kan. 897, 610 P.2d 1122 (1980).
67 Id at 904, 610 P.2d at 1127.
68 Id
69 284 So. 2d 686, 689 (Fla. 1973).
70 Id at 686.
71 In re Lacey, 283 N.W.2d 250, 252 (S.D. 1979).
72 Id at 251-52.
73 Id at 252.
74 33 N.Y.2d 559, 301 N.E.2d 426, 347 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1973).
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ing to leave questions of guilt or innocence to juries.75 He described appellate
division judges as "whores who became madams ' 76 and claimed they ob-
tained their positions through political patronage or money. 77 The court con-
cluded that isolated instances of disrespect for judges and courts are not
subject to professional discipline even when "expressed by vulgar and insult-
ing words or other incivility, uttered or written, or committed outside the
precincts of a court."
7 8
In In re Oliver,79 the Seventh Circuit reversed a district court decision
reprimanding an attorney for his criticisms of the judiciary but refused to go
as far as Justice Brennan in upholding all criticism that does not tend to
obstruct the administration of justice. Oliver involved an attorney who had
publicly commented on the district court's opinion in a pending case. He was
charged with violating a policy statement of the court prohibiting extra-judi-
cial discbssion of pending cases. 80 The Seventh Circuit held unconstitutional
a blanket prohibition against all extra-judicial comments by attorneys with-
out regard to whether the comment was or even could be prejudicial to the
fair administration of justice.8 ' The court limited the "prohibition against
dissemination of information to situations where 'there is a reasonable likeli-
hood that such dissemination will . . . prejudice the due administration of
justice.' "8s2
In Polk v. State Bar of Texas,8 3 the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas defined the types of comments that actually harm.
The Polk court held unconstitutional an attempt to discipline an attorney for
his statements about the criminal case in which he was the defendant on the
grounds that such statements were made in his capacity as a private citizen.
8 4
The court indicated that even statements made by an attorney in a profes-
sional capacity would be protected because a private citizen does not lose "his
right to free expression when he becomes a licensed attorney. '8 5 According
to the court, a state may not regulate an attorney's free speech rights under
the guise of prohibiting professional misconduct 8 6 unless its exercise will ad-
versely affect a significant state interest-that is, unless the attorney's conduct
(1) shows his inability to represent clients competently and honestly or (2)
"interferes with the processes of the administration of justice. T8 7 Unlike ear-
lier courts, the Polk court defines conduct affecting "the administration of
justice" to include only such conduct as "bribery of jurors, subornation of
perjury, misrepresentation to a court or any other conduct which undermines
75 Id at 560, 301 N.E.2d at 427, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 442.
76 Id
77 Id
78 Id at 559, 301 N.E.2d at 427, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 441.
79 452 F.2d 111 (7th Cir. 1971).
80 Id at 112.
81 Id at 114-15.
82 Id at 114, quoting Committee on the Operations of the Jury System of the Judicial Conference of
the United States, Report on the Free Press-Fair Trial Issue, 45 F.R.D. 391, 404 (1969).
83 374 F. Supp. 784 (N.D. Tex. 1974).
84 Id at 788.
85 Id at 787.
86 Id at 788.
87 Id
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the legitimacy of the judicial processes."88 By specifying inability to repre-
sent clients and interference with the administration of justice as the only
bases for restricting attorney criticism of the judiciary, the Polk court, like the
Brennan opinion in Sawyer, focused on the actual effect of the criticism. If a
state cannot show actual inability, bribery, perjury, or the like, the restriction
will not be upheld.
IV. The Balance of Constitutional Rights
As the Polk court indicated, in the area of attorney criticism of the judici-
ary, a balance must be struck between individual first amendment rights and
important state interests. Through its interpretations of the first amendment,
the Supreme Court has divided speech into two categories: (1) protected
speech such as political discussion and religious speech and (2) unprotected
speech such as libel and obscenity.89 A state may regulate unprotected
speech if the regulation is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. If
speech is protected, however, the reviewing court must balance the speaker's
first amendment rights against the government's interests in regulation. 90
The limitations on protected speech must not be "greater than is necessary or
essential to protect the particular government interest involved."91
The Polk court held that attorney criticism of the judiciary is protected
speech, because the interests of the attorney outweighed those of the state.
Most other courts, however, have shown more concern for maintaining re-
spect for the judicial system than for encouraging criticism of it.92 As a result,
the balance of interests has usually been tipped in favor of the state. A more
appropriate test would balance the state's interest in maintaining public con-
fidence in the legal system against both the attorney's interest in free speech
and the public's interest in proper official conduct. Balancing the interests in
this manner, the scale tips in favor of first amendment rights.
A. The State's Interest.- Maintaining Public Confidence in the Profession
An attorney's first amendment right to criticize the judiciary can be lim-
ited by the state only to protect of an overriding state interest. EC 8-6 of the
88 Id The court of appeals, in Polk, relied on three Supreme Court cases to reach the conclusion that
an attorney's right of free speech can only be restrained by a compelling state interest: Spevack v. Klein,
385 U.S. 511 (1967); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252
(1957). In Sfpevac, the Court held that the fifth amendment privilege against self incrimination applied to
state bar disciplinary proceedings. In Button and Konigsberg, the Court held that speech may not be regu-
lated under the guise of regulating conduct.
89 See generalb Emerson, The First Amendment and the Right to Know: Legal Foundations of the Right to Know,
1976 WASH. U.L.Q. 1; Emerson, TowardA General Theoy ofthe First Amendmen, 72 YALE L.J. 877 (1973).
U.S. CONsT. amend. I provides in relevant part: "Congress shall make no law.., abridging the
freedom ofspeech, or of the press. ... The first amendment applies to the states through the fourteenth
amendment. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10
(1964); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940).
90 See Note, Attornfy's Rights Under the Code ofProfessional Responsibilily: Free Speech, Right to Know, and
Freedom of Association, 1977 WASH. U.L.Q. 687.
91 Note, Professional Responsibility-Tral Pubicity-Speech Restrictions Must Be Narrowly Drawn, 54 TFx.
L. REV. 1158, 1165 (1976).
92 See, e.g., In re Friedland, 268 Ind. 536, 376 N.E.2d 1126 (1978); In re Terry, 71 Ind. Dec. 333, 394
N.E.2d 94 (1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1025 (1980); In re Frerichs, 238 N.E.2d 764 (Iowa 1976); State v.
Russell, 227 Kan. 897, 610 P.2d 1122 (1980); In re Lacey, 283 N.W.2d 250 (S.D. 1979).
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Code attempts to define the state's interest in restricting attorney criticism,
stating that "[a]djudicatory officials, not being wholly free to defend them-
selves, are entitled to receive the support of the bar against unjustified criti-
cism. . . .for unrestrained and intemperate statements tend to lessen public
confidence in our legal system." 93 A number of courts have cited EC 8-6 to
justify their restrictions on attorney criticism despite first amendment argu-
ments.
94
Attorney criticism of the judiciary undoubtedly lessens public confidence
in the legal system to a greater extent than does criticism by non-lawyers. 95
Because attorneys have special expertise in judicial matters, the public has
greater faith in attorneys' comments about the judiciary, even if the attorneys
use inappropriate language or make claims of which they are uncertain. The
public confidence in attorney criticism of the judiciary is one reason for im-
posing a higher standard of conduct on attorneys. 96 The state's interest in
preserving the public's confidence in the legal system cannot, however, be
considered in a vacuum. This interest must be balanced against the interests
of the attorney and the public.
B. The Attorne's Interest: Free Speech
The Supreme Court has frequently affirmed the right of the individual
citizen to comment on issues even when his remarks are highly critical or in
poor taste9 7 and even when the legal profession or the judiciary is the subject
of the criticism. 98 The Court has justified such criticism on the basis that the
legal profession and the judiciary might profit through public debate. 99
Under the rule adopted in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, °0 criticism of indi-
vidual judges can be classified as protected speech. In New York Times, the
Court held that a citizen's statements about a public official are constitution-
ally protected unless there is a showing that the declarant (1) knew the state-
ments were false or (2) published them with intentional or reckless disregard
for their truth. 0 1 The Court observed that free speech was given constitu-
tional protection to assure unfettered interchange of ideas to bring about po-
93 ABA CODE, EC 8-6.
94 See In re Shimek, 284 So. 2d 686 (Fla. 1973); In re Frerichs, 238 N.E.2d 764 (Iowa 1976); In re Lacey,
283 N.W.2d 250 (S.D. 1979).
95 Essay, Three Discussions ofLegal Ethics, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 452, 468 (1977).
96 Id
97 See, e.g., Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Eaton v. Tulsa, 415 U.S. 697 (1974); Cohen v. Cali-
fornia, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1965); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
98 See, e.g., Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
99 See Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962).
100 376 U.S. 254 (1964). In this case, a New York newspaper published an editorial advertisement
criticizing Alabama officials' handling of racial matters and seeking financial support for the Negro right-
to-vote movement and the Negro student movement. An elected commissioner of Montgomery, Alabama,
brought a civil libel action against the publisher of the newspaper and the clergymen whose names ap-
peared in the advertisement. Id at 256. The Circuit Court of Montgomery County awarded $500,000 to
the plaintiff and, on appeal, the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the award. Id The Supreme Court
of the United States reversed holding that "the Constitution delimits a State's power to award damages for
libel in actions brought by public officials against critics of their official conduct." Id at 283.
101 Id at 279-80. "Reckless" conduct is not measured by a reasonable person standard, or by whether
a reasonable person would have investigated before publishing. Instead, there must be a showing that the
declarant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truthfulness of the publication. St. Amant v. Thomp-
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litical and social changes desired by the public. 10 2 The first amendment
requires that debate on public issues be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.
Such debate might well include vehement, caustic, and sharp attacks on the
government and public officials.1
0 3
In evaluating the constitutionality of restrictions on attorney criticism of
the judiciary, the main concern is the harm likely to result if attorneys are
held to a standard of conduct higher than that imposed upon laymen. The
practical effect of a higher standard is a restriction on all attorney criticism of
the judiciary. Faced with the possibility of disbarment or suspension, an at-
torney who considers criticizing the judiciary will generally choose to be si-
lent. This silence not only chills the attorney's first amendment rights but
also deprives the public of an invaluable critic. The attorney is ideally situ-
ated to understand the workings of the judiciary and to expose its failures.1
0 4
As one commentator has written,
there is a high price paid in leaving to non-lawyers the primary responsibility for
educating the lay public about the inadequacies of our courts. In the end, the public
may have gained in its impression of lawyers and judges, but it will be blinded to
what reform is actually needed in the legal system.
0 5
C. The Public-s Interest: The Right to Know
Even though the balance between the government's interest in maintain-
ing public confidence in the legal system and the attorney's right to free
speech could arguably be tipped in favor of the state, when the public's right
to know is added to the balance, the scale tips in favor of increased protection
for attorney criticism of the judiciary. The public is affected greatly by the
conduct and quality of lawyers and judges. It has an interest, therefore, in
being informed about problems in the legal system. Courts have recently
recognized that the first amendment guarantees a "right to know," that is, a
right to receive information communicated by another person.10 6 This right
son, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968). A mere showing that the utterances were motivated by ill-will toward the
defamed person is not enough. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 79 (1964).
102 376 U.S. at 269.
103 Id at 270.
104 See ABA CODE, EC 8-1. See generally Note, Attorng Discipline and the First Amendment, supra note 9, at
926; Note, supra note 90, at 688, Comment, supra note 4, at 601.
105 Dershowitz, Betraying the Bill of Rightr, N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 1976, § 7, at 1, col. 1.
106 For cases that have recognized the right to know, see, e.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 408-
09 (1973) (right to receive mail from prisoners); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762, 765 (1972)
(right to receive information from an excluded alien); Organization For A Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S.
415, 419-20 (1971) (right to distribute informational literature); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395
U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (right of viewers and listeners to obtain information of public concern); Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) (right to read or view obscene materials in the privacy of one's home);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (right to receive information about and use contracep-
tives); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 304 (1965) (right to receive "communist political
propaganda"); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (right to receive religious information).
For a general discussion of the right to know, see Bloustein, The First Amendment and Privay: The
Supreme CourtJustice and the Philosopher, 28 RUTGERs L. REV. 41 (1974); Emerson, Legal Foundations of the
Right to Know, supra note 89; Bork, Neutral P'nciple and Some First Amendment Problenm, 47 IND. LJ. 1 (1971);
Brennan, The Supreme Court andthe Meitjohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1965);
Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is An Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REv. 245; Note, supra note 90, at 706-08;
Comment, The Right to Receive and the Commercial Speech Doctrine: New Constitutional Considerations, 63 GEO.
LJ. 775 (1975); Comment, Freedom to Hear- A Foliticaljustlfcation of the First Amendment, 46 WASH. L. REV.
311 (1971).
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assumes that society benefits from informed decisionmaking. As the Supreme
Court observed in Virginia State Board of Pharmay v. Virginia Citiens Consumer
Council, Inc. ,107 "people will perceive their own best interests if only they are
well enough informed."' 08 The right to know includes (1) the right to obtain
written and spoken communications and (2) the right to obtain information
as a basis for transmitting ideas and facts to other people. 0 9 Although simi-
lar to the right to communicate, the right to know should be recognized as an
independent right. Situations may arise in which the interests of the commu-
nicator conflict with those of the listener or in which the communicator may
not be in a position to assert his rights.' t0 The right to know is important
not only for truthseeking and collective decisionmaking but also for effectuat-
ing social change without violence or coercion.I1 '
On numerous occasions, the Supreme Court has recognized a constitu-
tional right to know. In Lamont v. Postmaster General, 1 2 the Court upheld the
right of citizens to receive foreign "propoganda" without notifying govern-
mental authorities. In Virginia Board of Pharmacy,113 the Court recognized the
right of the consumer to receive price advertisements for standard prescrip-
tion drugs.
The right to know is not, however, as widely accepted as the right to free
speech: its contours remain obscure. The Supreme Court has not always rec-
ognized the right to know when balancing private interests against govern-
mental interests. In Zemel v. Rush ,114 for example, the Court upheld blanket
restrictions on the right of American citizens to travel to Cuba. In Kleindienst
v. Mandel, 1 5 it refused to recognize the right of American citizens to hear a
lecture by a foreigner who had been denied a visa.
Justifying an infringement of the right to know has become increasingly
difficult, however. For example, in Bigelow v. Virgin'a, 16 the Court said that
a reasonable regulation that serves a legitimate public interest was sufficient
to defeat the receipient's right to know. In Virgin'a Board of Pharmaqy, how-
ever, the Court required a stronger state interest to restrict pharmaceutical
price advertising. It indicated that state regulations on commercial speech
would be upheld if the speech (1) is false, deceptive, or misleading or (2)
107 425 U.S. 748 (1976). In Virginiz Board of Pharmay, the Supreme Court held that a Virginia statute
barring advertisement of prescription drug prices violated the first and fourteenth amendments and could
not bejustified on the basis of the state's interest in maintaining the professionalism of its licensed pharma-
cists.
108 Id at 770.
109 Emerson, Legal Foundations ofthe Right to Know, supra note 89, at 2.
110 Id
IlI Id It has been suggested that the right to know be adopted as the principle basis for the constitu-
tional protection afforded by the first amendment. Alexander Meiklejohn is the primary source of this
theory. He maintains that the private citizen, in his capacity as sovereign master over the public servants
of the government, has the right to receive information. That right is "the exclusive justification" for
according all persons freedom of speech and other first amendment rights. Id at 4. Insofar as a communi-
cation contributes to the public's right to know, it is in his view entitled to absolute protection under the
first amendment. Id
112 381 U.S. 301, 304 (1965).
113 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
114 381 U.S. 1 (1945).
115 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
116 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
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proposes an illegal transaction. 1 7 More recently, in Bates v. State Bar of Ari-
zona,t18 the Supreme Court expanded the public's right to receive informa-
tion while simultaneously eliminating restrictions on commercial speech.
In Bates, the Court was presented with the question of whether a state
may prevent the publication in a newspaper of an attorney's truthful adver-
tisement for routine legal services. Prior to 1977, the Code of Professional
Responsibility limited the attorney's right to advertise.1 19 The courts upheld
the disciplinary rules prohibiting attorney advertising on the basis that such
advertising would stir up litigation, encourage misrepresentation, and reduce
the image of the profession in the eyes of the public.' 20  Regulation of an
attorney's right to advertise had been considered a valid exercise of the state's
police power necessary to maintain the integrity of the profession.121
The Bates decision ended the ban on attorney advertising. The Court
held that application of the disciplinary rule against the appellants violated
the first amendment. 22 According to the Court, the disciplinary rule inhib-
ited the free flow of commercial information and kept the public ignorant of
the availability of legal services. 123 Rejecting the arguments that attorney
advertising would undermine professionalism 124 and increase litigation, the
Court said that the bar was obligated to aid consumers in intelligently select-
ing attorneys to serve their needs.'
25
Bates focused not on the rights of the attorney but on the "right of the
public as consumers and citizens to know about the activities of the legal
profession."' 126 Relying on the attorney-layman distinction, courts had sum-
marily dismissed attacks on advertising restrictions. 127 By concentrating in-
117 425 U.S. at 771-72. For a complete discussion of commercial speech as a protected right, see Note,
Solicitation By Attornqys: A Prediction andA Recommendation, 16 Hous. L. REy. 452, 459-64 (1979); Comment,
Commercial Speech And the Limits of Legal Advertising, 58 OR. L. REV. 193 (1979).
118 433 U.S. 350 (1977). The attorneys in Bates operated a legal clinic which handled routine matters
for standard fees. In an effort to increase business and attract more clients, they placed an advertisement
in a local newspaper. Id at 354. The state bar association found the advertisement violative of the state's
code. id at 356. For a complete discussion of Bates, see Note, Bates v. State Bar of Arizona: The First
Amendment Right of Attorngy Advertisement of Routine Legal Service Fees, 5 T.x. So. L. REv. 198 (1978); Com-
ment, supra note 117, at 210-13.
119 ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY, DR 2-101(B) (1975) provided, in relevant part:
A lawyer shall not publicize himself, or his partner, or associate, or any other lawyer affiliated
with him or his firm, as a lawyer through newspaper or magazine advertisements, radio or
television announcements, display advertisements in city or telephone directories, or other
means of commercial publicity, nor shall he authorize or permit others to do so in his behalf.
120 See Note, Advertising, Solicitation and the ProfessionIs Duty to Make Legal Counsel Available, 81 YALE L.J.
1181, 1184 (1972).
121 See, e.g., Hartford County Grievance Comm. v. Cole, 22 Conn. Supp. 86, 161 A.2d 590 (1960); In re
Hallett, 58 Ill. 2d 239, 319 N.E.2d 48 (1974); In re Braun, 61 N.J. 119, 293 A.2d 186 (1972); In re Rothman,
12 N.J. 528, 97 A.2d 621 (1953); In re Connelly, 18 App. Div. 2d 466, 240 N.Y.S.2d 126 (1963); In re
Anonymous, 32 App. Div. 2d 37, 299 N.Y.S.2d 240 (1969). Seegeneraly DRINKER, supra note 4, at 210-20.
122 433 U.S. at 384.
123 Id at 365. The Court in Bates found that the conclusion that the disciplinary rule on advertising
"is violative of the First Amendment might be said to flow afortiori" from the holding in Virginia Board of
Pharmay. Id For a discussion of Bates in relation to the development of commercial speech as a protected
right, see Note, supra note 117, at 457-64.
124 433 U.S. at 368-72.
125 Id at 375-78.
126 Id at 358.
127 It was generally held that the ethics of the legal profession forbade attorneys from advertising their
skills as shopkeepers advertise their wares. Prior to 1976, courts restricted attorney criticism on the
grounds that attorneys practice a profession whereas shopkeepers conduct a trade. See DRINKER, .XUpra
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stead on the public's right to know and to receive information, the Bates court
rejected the advertising ban while implicitly granting attorneys commercial
speech privileges. The Court thus avoided directly addressing both the free
speech issue and the attorney-layman distinction.
The rationale of Bates in affording some degree of first amendment pro-
tection to commercial speech by attorneys can be extended to other forms of
speech by attorneys. An attorney's right to criticize the judiciary, like his
right to advertise, warrants first amendment protection not only because an
attorney, as an individual citizen, has a right to free speech, but also because
the public has a right to receive information about the judiciary. An attor-
ney's right to criticize the judiciary exceeds his right to advertise because crit-
icism is not subject to any commercial limitations. To suppress all attorney
criticism because some criticism might be harmful defeats the spirit of the
first amendment.
V. Recommendations
Changes in the law and in the role of the attorney in society warrant a
reevaluation of the limitations on attorney criticism of the judiciary. The
Code's restriction of conduct "prejudicial to the administration of justice" is
too vague. The time is ripe for the Supreme Court and the organized bar to
reconsider their positions with respect to attorney criticism of the judiciary.
A. The Role ofthe Supreme Court
Attorney criticism of the judiciary raises a question of jurisprudential
importance. It is a recurring constitutional issue and, as such, warrants con-
sideration by the Supreme Court. The Court must develop a uniform stan-
dard for measuring attorney liability, consistent with its position in Bates.
There are two possible approaches for the Court to follow in developing a
new standard. It can consider the question of attorney criticism in light of
the right to know doctrine-an approach that flows logically from its decision
in Bates. Alternatively, the Court can resolve the question on the basis of the
attorney-layman distinction-an issue clearly foreshadowed but left unan-
swered in Bates.
The time has come for the Court to face the question of whether to elimi-
nate the attorney-layman distinction and hold that first amendment protec-
tion extends to attorney criticism of the judiciary. Such criticism can be
measured by the standards governing a layman's comments about a public
official. There is both state and federal authority for finding the New York
Tznes rule applicable to attorney criticism of the judiciary. In Eisenberg v.
Boardman128 and State Bar of Texas v. Semaan,129 the courts recognized that
note 4, at 5, 210-11. Cases distinguishing the legal profession from a trade include Hartford County Griev-
ance Comm. v. Cole, 22 Conn. Supp. 86, 161 A.2d 590 (1960); State ex reZ Hunter v. Crocker, 132 Neb.
214, 271 N.W. 444 (1937); In re Rothman, 12 N.J. 528, 97 A.2d 621 (1953); In re Duffy, 19 App. Div. 2d
177, 242 N.Y.S.2d 665 (1963).
128 302 F. Supp. 1360 (D. Wis. 1969). In Eisenberg, the attorneys publicly circulated statements accus-
ing a district court judge of criminal misconduct and caused advertisements to be run in newspapers
soliciting complaints about the judge. Id at 1361. They also issued a press release about the judge which
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attorneys who made derogatory statements about public officials, including
judges, were protected under the first and fourteenth amendments from crim-
inal and civil sanctions, unless the statements were made with knowledge of
their falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth. In Semaan, the Texas
Court of Civil Appeals declared that the New York Times protection "un-
doubtedly extends on the same terms to lawyers, at least for utterances made
outside the course of judicial proceedings."' 30 Although the courts have not
applied the New York Times rule to disciplinary proceedings, Semaan recog-
nized that the Supreme Court's language in Garison v. Louisiana 131 indicated
that any restriction upon the free flow of information to the public concern-
ing the performance and qualifications of public officials is likely to be held
unconstitutional. 132 Semaan noted that constitutional protection in other ar-
eas-specifically the privilege against self-incrimination-is available to an
attorney in a disbarment proceeding.13 3 By applying the New York Times rule
to attorney criticism of the judiciary, the Court will not only establish a uni-
form standard for regulating attorney criticism but also destroy the tradi-
tional attorney-layman distinction with regard to free speech.
If the Court hesitates to eliminate the attorney-layman distinction, it can
nevertheless expand the attorney's first amendment right and acknowledge
the public's right to know by applying the Bates rationale to the question of
attorney criticism of the judiciary. In Bates, the Court recognized the right of
attorney advertising only after the right to advertise was afforded to other
professionals. Similarly, having recognized the right of the layman to criti-
cize a public official, the Court can take the next step and remove the restric-
tions on attorney criticism of the judiciary. Attorneys do not surrender their
first amendment rights when they take their professional oaths.134 In addi-
tion, attorneys are best able to criticize the legal profession because of their
position within it. Their special insight elevates their right to criticize to a
duty to inform the public.
he was forced to read in open court. Id at 1362. Even though the court recognized and supported the New
York Timer standard for cases of attorney criticism of the judiciary, it disciplined the attorneys declaring:
As statements made they were protected speech, but the complaint clearly does not stop with
charging the making of the statements. . . . Rather it charges a course of conduct which is
alleged to be unprofessional, and the fact that speech is intermingled with conduct does not
endow the conduct with constitutional protection.
Id at 136!-65.
129 508 S.W.2d 429 Cex. Civ. App. 1974). In response to an editorial in a local newspaper criticizing
the conduct of a district court judge at trial, an attorney wrote a "letter to the editor" agreeing with the
editorial and comparing the judge unfavorably to other named judges in regard to knowledge of the law
and impartiality. Id at 431. The court said that the criticism related entirely to the writer's opinion of
the qualifications of the judge and no issue of falsity or improper motive was involved. Id at 432.
130 Id at 432-33.
131 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
132 508 S.W.2d at 433.
133 Id
134 Se, e.g., Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967) (recognizing an attorney's privilege against self-
incrimination in state bar disciplinary proceedings); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (recognizing
the right of NAACP staffattorneys to advise prospective litigants to seek legal assistance and to refer them
to particular attorneys); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957) (recognizing the right of bar appli-
cants to refuse to answer questions about their political beliefs or associations).
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B. The Role of the American Bar Association
Although the issue of attorney criticism of the judiciary will probably be
resolved by the Court, the American Bar Association can offer timely com-
ments on the role of the organized bar in removing the ban on attorney criti-
cism of the judiciary. The ABA is currently revising the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct will have
a statutory effect in states in which they are adopted.1 3 5 The ABA should,
therefore, reevaluate its current position on attorney criticism in light of the
recent Supreme Court decisions on attorney speech and include an appropri-
ate standard in the Model Rules.
The proposed Model Rules contain only one provision addressing attor-
ney statements about the judiciary. Rule 10.2 provides:
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement concerning the qualifica-
tions of ajudge or other adjudicatory officer or of a candidate for election or appoint-
ment to a judicial office.
(b) A lawyer who is a candidate for judicial office shall comply with the applicable
provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Rule 10.2 combines several disciplinary rules and ethical considerations in
the Code. The language of rule 10.2(a) is almost identical to that of DR 8-
102, combining the subsections of the disciplinary rule into one concise sen-
tence. 136 The comment following rule 10.2, however, substantially improves
the Code's language. The comment recognizes that the public relies upon the
opinions of attorneys in evaluating the professional and personal fitness of
candidates for judicial office. The comment encourages "honest and candid
opinions" about judges and judicial officers, restricting only "false state-
ments" because they "unfairly undermine public confidence in the legal sys-
tem." 13 7 Whereas the Code refuses to justify "[c]riticisms motivated by
reasons other than a desire to improve the legal system,"1 38 the Model Rules
permit honest opinions regardless of the attorney's motive.
Nonetheless, the Model Rules are concerned about maintaining public
confidence in the legal system. Unlike the Code, however, which restricts all
potentially harmful statements, the Model Rules restrict only false statements
which harm the public image of the profession. The Model Rules echo the
language of New York Times, restricting only knowingly false statements. Be-
cause the language of the Model Rules clarifies the ambiguous and restrictive
language of the Code, the states should adopt the Model Rules soon after
their promulgation.
VI. Conclusion
As a guardian of public interests, the organized bar has a duty to inform
the public of the activities of the judiciary and the qualifications of its offi-
135 PROPOSED ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, American Bar Association Commis-
sion on Evaluation of Professional Standards (Discussion ed. Jan. 30, 1980). The Commission plans to
submit a final draft of the Model Rules to the ABA House of Delegates in 1982.
136 PROPOSED ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 10.2.
137 Id, Comment.
138 ABA CODE, EC 8-6.
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cials. The proposed Model Rules uphold that duty by permitting "honest
and candid" attorney criticism of the judiciary. As the guardian of constitu-
tional privileges, the Supreme Court also has a duty to eliminate restrictions
on attorneys' right to free speech and the public's right to know. In Bates, the
Court held that a state supreme court cannot, through the application of a
disciplinary rule, abridge an attorney's right to commercial speech when the
public's right to know is involved.139 Similarly, the Court can no longer jus-
tify applying disciplinary rules to restrict an attorney's right to criticize the
judiciary, especially when such restriction would also abridge the public's
right to know. As the Supreme Court of Wisconsin observed almost fifty
years ago,
[c]ourts would be entering upon a dangerous field if they assumed to disbar attorneys
because of criticism of courts based upon improper motives. It best conforms to the
spirit of our institutions to permit everyone to say what he will about courts, and
leave the destiny of courts to the good judgment of the people.14
0
Sandra M. Moll,
139 433 U.S. at 384.
140 In re Cannon, 206 Wis. 374, 409, 240 N.W. 441, 455 (1932).
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